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THE ADMINISTRATIVE FREEZE AND THE AUTOMATIC
STAY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
A bank generally has a right to set off the amount of a customer loan
against the amount in the customer's bank accounts. Several conflicting
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code (Code), however, put a bank in a
quandary when a customer files for bankruptcy. The bank's right of setoff
is recognized by the Code as a secured claim,' but the Code does not make
clear whether the bank may place an administrative hold or freeze2 on the
account in order to protect its setoff right.3 The ability to place an
administrative freeze on the account is important for a bank because the
bank will wish to prevent the customer's account from being dissipated
while the exercise of the bank's setoff right is stayed by the Code.4 Thus,
a bank must know whether its action in freezing the debtor's account
violates the Code's automatic stay provision, section 362.'
The application of section 362 to a bank's imposition of an administra-
tive freeze yields anything but a clear result and has engendered debate
among both courts and commentators.6 This debate has had a narrow
focus: May a bank place an administrative freeze on a debtor's account
without violating section 362, the automatic stay provision? Both those
who find that the freeze violates the automatic stay and those who find that
it does not, have pointed to specific language in the Code supporting their
position.7 This is not surprising because the relevant Code sections are in
1. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988).
2. A "freeze" is an administrative hold on an account whereby the account is not debited. James
H. Wynn, Freeze and Recoupment: Methods for Circumventing the Automatic Stay?, 5 BANKR. DEv.
J. 85 n. 1 (1987). "The debtor is merely prevented from utilization of the funds in the account." Id.
3. The courts are divided on whether the "freeze" constitutes a violation of the automatic stay
provision. See, e.g., In re Wildcat Constr. Co., 57 B.R. 981 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986); Williams v.
American Bank of Mid-Cities, N.A. (In re Williams), 61 B.R. 576 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986). Several
articles have also been written on the issue. See, e.g, Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, Freezing
the Debtor's Account: A Banker's Dilemma Under the Bankruptcy Code, 100 BANKING L.J. 316 (1983);
Wynn, supra note 2.
4. See Wynn, supra note 2, at 86-87.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
6. See supra note 3.
7. Compare Crispell v. Landmark Bank (In re Crispell), 73 B.R. 375, 379 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1987) (positing that "freeze" is implied by a reading of sections 362(a)(7), 542(b), and 553) (quoting
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conflict! In addition to those weighing in on one side of the debate or the
other, a recent decision, In re Patterson,9 has presented banks with an
alternative to the administrative freeze. Unfortunately, each of these
approaches suffers from the same flaw-failure to balance the competing
policies presented in light of the nature of the proceeding.
The conflicting sections of the Code regarding the administrative freeze
and automatic stay issue illustrate the need to redraft the language of the
Code. Until the Code is redrafted, courts should look to the purpose of the
Code as a whole and review individual Code provisions within a specific
contextual framework. Upon doing so, courts would find that the rationale
for allowing or disallowing a freeze depends upon the nature of the
proceeding before the court.' The proper analysis of an administrative
Stann v. Mid American Credit Union, 39 B.tR 246, 248 (D. Kan. 1984)) with In re Quality Interiors,
127 B.R. 391, 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) (noting that because a bank's setoff interest in deposit
accounts is limited by sections 363(a), 506(a) and 553, a bank which unilaterally freezes a debtor's
account reaches beyond its rights in the Code).
8. The relevant sections are: the automatic stay of section 362; the bank's right to setoff in
section 553; the right to setoff as a secured claim in section 506; the cash collateral provision of section
363; and the turnover provisions of section 542. See Jack F. Williams, Application of the Cash
Collateral Paradigm to the Preservation of the Right to Setoff in Bankruptcy, 7 BANKR. DEv. J. 27, 54
(1990).
For example, one of the conflicts is between 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) which stays "any act to obtain
possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property
of the estate" upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition and I 1 U.S.C. § 542(a) which provides that "an
entity... shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property [of the estate) or the value of such
property .. " If an administrative freeze violates section 362(a)(3) as an act to exercise control over
property of the estate, then the bank must honor checks drawn on the debtor's account. However, to
the extent that such funds are cash collateral, they are property of the estate which cannot be used
except by permission of the court or by consent of the bank. Therefore to turn over the funds would
be to violate section 542. The bank is put in a no-win situation for which the Code provides no
guidance. The situation illustrates the need to look not at the specific language of the Code sections
but to overall Code policy within a specific context in order to reach a solution. See infra part V.
9. In re Patterson, 967 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1992).
10. For example, there are differing rationales for a setoff in a Chapter 7 liquidation as opposed
to a Chapter 11 reorganization. See infra part V.
This Note treats the Chapter 13 "adjustment of debts" proceeding as equivalent to a Chapter 11
proceeding. This treatment is justified because proprietors of small businesses may file under Chapter
13. See WILIAM R. MAPOTHER, CREDITORS AND THE NEW BANKRUPTCY CODE 191 (3rd ed. 1981).
Moreover, because consumers can successfully reorganize under Chapter 13, small business proprietors
may also be hurt in a Chapter 13 setting through use of the freeze. See Georgia Federal Bank, FSB v.
Owens-Peterson (In re Owens-Peterson), 39 B.L 186, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984). Therefore, the
same rationale applies. Similarly, because Chapter 9 incorporates many of the provisions of a Chapter
11 reorganization, the Chapter 11 analysis would also apply to a Chapter 9 proceeding. See Ronald M.
Martin, Creditor Alternatives To Obtain Relief From Automatic Stays In Bankruptcy, 98 BANKING L.J.
525, 527 (1981).-
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freeze problem must tie the right to freeze to the basis for a setoff in the
circumstances of the case before the court. Broad pronouncements by
courts that the administrative freeze violates the automatic stay" are
misguided.
Part II of this Note analyzes the relevant sections of the Code and
describes the competing arguments for application of these sections to the
administrative freeze problem. Part III discusses the cases interpreting the
freeze. Part IV examines the recent case of In re Patterson2 which
provided banks with an alternative to using the administrative freeze.
Finally, Part V criticizes the Patterson decision and sets forth a new
approach that more appropriately addresses the competing policies
confronting courts faced with an administrative freeze issue.
II. DISCUSSION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. The Automatic Stay
The heart of the current controversy is whether the administrative freeze
violates the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision, section 362.13
The automatic stay is a fundamental debtor protection device, which is
designed to provide the debtor with a repose from debt and a financial
fresh start. 4 However, the stay also serves creditors' interests by
providing for the orderly administration of the debtor's estate.'5 By
11. See, e.g., Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Cent. Fidelity Bank (In re Kenney's Franchise Corp.),
12 B.R. 390 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981), rev'd, 22 B.R. 747 (W.D. Va. 1982).
12. 967 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1992).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). See, e.g., Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 3.
14. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5840 ("[T]he automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy
laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. ... It permits the debtor ... to be
relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.'). See also Robert A. Johnson &
Marilyn C. O'Leary, Automatic Stay Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 13 N.M. L. REV. 599,
602 (1983) ("[T]he automatic stay of proceedings assures the debtor a breathing space in which to take
stock of assets and assess liabilities free from the pressure of anxious creditors.").
15. See, I DAVID G. EPsTErN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 3.3, at 86 (1992) ("The automatic stay
ensures that no creditor receives more than an equitable share of the bankrupt's estate.") (quoting In
re Guterl Special Steel Corp., I I B.R. 107, 110 (W.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd, 916 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1640 (1991)). See also Johnson & O'Leary, supra note 14, at 602. Johnson
and O'Leary assert that:
The stay prevents piecemeal dismantling of the estate and guarantees creditors that no one in
their same position will receive proportionately more return on an extension of credit than will
they .... The purpose of the stay is not to alter substantive rights of creditors, but merely
to stay the exercise of these rights.
19941
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preventing a "rush" to the debtor's assets, the stay ensures that each
creditor will be treated fairly.16
The scope of the automatic stay provision, section 362, is extremely
broad and the section applies to all entities opposing the debtor. 7 The
stay does not extinguish a creditor's claim or other rights but only delays
enforcing them.' Section 362 provides that specified actions are exempt
Id. The legislative history adopted a similar view:
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors would be
able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property. Those who acted first would
obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors.
Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors
are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97.
16. See Rett White Motor Sales Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 99 B.R. 12, 13 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1989)
(quoting Price & Pierce Int'l, Inc. v. Spicers Int'l Paper Sales, Inc., 50 B.R. 25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
The court noted:
The primary purpose of an automatic stay subsequent to the filing of a bankruptcy petition
is "to preserve what remains of the debtor's insolvent estate and to provide a systematic
equitable liquidation procedure for all creditors secured and unsecured.., thereby preventing
a chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the debtor's assets in a variety of uncoordinated
proceedings in different courts."
Id.
17. See 2 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.04, at 362-34 (Lawrence P.
King, ed., 15th ed. 1991) ("The stay of section 362 is extremely broad in scope and, aside from the
limited exceptions of subsection (b), should apply to almost any type of formal or informal action
against the debtor or the property of the estate.').
The automatic stay applies to eight actions. 11 U.S.C. § 3 62(a) provides that:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,
302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,
of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process,
of ajudicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could
have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover
a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate of a judgment
obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or
to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the
extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court
concerning the debtor.
18. 1 EPsTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, § 3.3, at 86.
[VOL. 72:441
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from the stay 9 and that a creditor may obtain relief from the stay under
certain circumstances." The stay goes into effect immediately upon the
filing of a petition and continues until the estate property is exempted, sold
or otherwise disposed of by the estate.2
In applying the automatic stay, courts must keep in mind the dual
purposes of alleviating pressure on the debtor and ensuring equality of
19. However, it must be noted that these exemptions are limited. I1 U.S.C. § 362(b). Further,
the court may still enjoin these actions, but because the stay does not apply automatically, the debtor
must move the court for action to be taken. See, Johnson & O'Leary, supra note 14, at 607-08.
Johnson and O'Leary state:
[I]t should not be assumed that these kinds of acts always should proceed. Rather,... the
court... can stay matters not automatically stayed. However,... these acts are not affected
by the automatic stay, and thus without intervention by the court will proceed without regard
to the bankruptcy.
Id.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) provides:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief
from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling,
modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(]) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such
party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this section,
if-
(A) The debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
While the legislative history uses real property as an example to indicate when relief might be
warranted, the language of the statute should be read as applying to all property which is encumbered
by a creditor's interest. In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 B.R. 635, 641 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
Subsection (d)(l) is largely a restatement of the law under the Bankruptcy Act (Act) and reflects the
policy of the cases decided under the Act. Id. at 642. In cases decided under the Act, the relevant
factors in determining whether relief should be granted were: whether continuation of the stay would
result in an undue risk of material harm to the creditor, whether there was a reasonable possibility of
reorganization or rehabilitation; whether the property was needed by the debtor for a rehabilitation; and
whether there was equity in the property that might be realized for the benefit of the debtor or its
creditors. Id.
Most frequently, cause is shown by a debtor's failure to afford adequate protection of a secured
creditor's interest in its security. In re Lilyerd, 49 B.R. 109, 116 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). The debtor
has the exclusive responsibility of proposing a method of adequate protection. In re Tudor Motor
Lodge Ass'n, 102 B.R. 936, 954 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989).
Subsection (d)(2) applies only to the stay under subsection (a) of an act against property.
2 COLLIER, supra note 17, 362.07, at 362-69. Section 362 should require relief from the stay if there
is no reasonable likelihood of reorganization. Id.
21. See 1 W. HOMER DRAKE, JR., BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER
§ 9.02, at 9-20 (2d ed. 1992) ("Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition ... the automatic stay
continues with respect to any act against property of the estate as long as such property maintains such
a status."). See generally I EPsTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, § 3.23 (noting that the stay continues until
the case is ended, a discharge is granted or denied, the property leaves the estate, or relief is granted).
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treatment for creditors.22 The automatic stay is designed first to provide
breathing room for the debtor.' To the extent that an administrative
freeze disrupts the debtor's repose, it violates this policy and courts should
not allow its use.24 The creditor bank should not be able to deny the
debtor or trustee use of deposited funds without obtaining a court order.2"
Under certain circumstances, however, the automatic stay's second
purpose-to enforce the orderly administration of the estate-must be given
more weight.26 If a bank is not allowed to freeze the account, then funds
which belong to the estate, subject to the bank's right of setoff, may be
dissipated.27 Because the freeze helps to maintain the "status quo" as it
existed prior to the filing of the petition, it furthers section 362's policy of
orderly administration.28 This argument favors use of the freeze.29
Thus, the dual policies of the Code's automatic stay provision often
conflict. Therefore, one must look elsewhere for a solution.
B. Setoff Under the Code-Section 553
A solution to this problem may be found in section 553 which clearly
establishes that a bank's right to setoff30 is preserved by the Code.3"
22. See 2 DANIEL R. COvANS, COWANS BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACrICE § 11.3, at 301 (1989
ed.). Cowans observes:
The purposes of the stay have been described as to protect the debtor and creditors by
allowing the debtor to organize his affairs and to insure that the bankruptcy procedure
operates to allow an orderly resolution of all claims .... The stay is for the benefit of the
creditors as well as the debtor ....
Id.
23. See supra note 14.
24. In particular, the freeze violates the concept of repose in reorganization cases because the
debtor needs the cash collateral to meet operating expenses.
25. See Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 3, at 321.
26. See supra note 16.
27. While the bank can make a request for lifting the stay, the motion need not be ruled on for
thirty days. See Barkley Clark, Bank Exercise of Setoff: Avoiding the Pitfalls, 98 BANKINO L.J. 196,
224-26 (1981).
28. See supra note 16; Johnson & O'Leary, supra note 14, at 602 (stating that the stay assures
creditors equality of returns on extensions of credit).
29. One author, however, has argued that the freeze disrupts the orderly administration of the
estate and should be considered a violation of the automatic stay. See RICHARD I. AARON,
BANKRUPTCY LAW FuNDAMENTALs § 5.01 (1992). The administrative freeze is justified only in
instances in which the bank is seeking to protect its access to claimed cash collateral. The Code
discourages this kind of self-help and unilateral action. Id. Further, Congress seemed to adopt this
view when it amended section 362(a)(3) to add an exercise of control over property of the estate as a
stayed action. Id.
30. See generally Alan M. Ahart, Bank Setoff Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J 205 (1979). Setoff is the right which exists between parties to net their debts where each
[VOL. 72:441
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Because a deposit in a bank creates a debtor-creditor relationship between
the bank and the depositor,32 a bank may set its obligation off against any
debts which the debtor owes to it.33 Banks attempt to justify the adminis-
trative freeze as a way to protect their right to setoff.34 Therefore, whether
the bank retains a right to setoff under the Bankruptcy Code is of critical
importance.35
The right to setoff existing under state law is retained by the current
Code under section 553.36 To establish a right to setoff, a creditor must
show a prepetition debt owed by the creditor to the debtor,37 a prepetition
party owes the other an ascertained amount. Id. In an action for the larger debt, only the balance is
recoverable. IML Freight, Inc. v. United States (In re IML Freight, Inc.), 65 B.R. 788 (Bankr. D. Utah
1986).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) provides, inter alia, that:
[T]his title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such
creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against
a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.
Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code does not create or define, but rather, recognizes and preserves the
common-law right of setoff under nonbankruptcy law. The Code is not an independent source of the
right to setoff and the creditor must establish a right to setoff by applying the law of the state where
the facts occurred. See Moses v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Moses), 91 B.R. 994, 996 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1988); In re McLean Indus., Inc., 90 B.R. 614, 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Kittrell v. State
Employees Credit Union (In re Kittrell), 115 B.R. 873, 881 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1990). The right to
setoff is recognized to prevent the possible injustice of compelling a creditor to pay his indebtedness
to the debtor in full when his claim may only be partially paid, if at all. Morristown Lincoln-Mercury
v. Hamilton Bank of Morristown (In re Morristown Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.), 42 B.R. 413, 416 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1984). Without recognition of the right to setoff, an attempt to set off would amount to a
preference under section 547 and would be invalid. In re Moses, 91 B.R. at 996.
32. See Clark, supra note 27, at 196.
33. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 17, 553.15, at 553-67.
34. See Kathleen Thome, Note, Automatic Stay: Section 362, 3 BANKR. DEv. J. 181, 187 (1986)
("[T]he majority trend is to view the administrative freeze as an appropriate way for the bank to
'maintain the status quo' until the rights of the parties can be determined by a bankruptcy court.')
(footnotes omitted).
35. The right to setoff should be distinguished from recoupment. Recoupment requires that the
mutual demands must arise from the same transaction on which the plaintiff has sued. Setoffis stayed
by section 362; recoupment is not. Therefore, recoupment allows a creditor to assert that certain mutual
claims extinguish one another when setoff would not be allowed without prior judicial approval. This
treatment results because it is considered inequitable to apply the limitation on setoff to the right of
rccoupment. See, Wynn, supra note 2, at 102-06; Holford v. Powers (In re Holford), 896 F.2d 176,
179 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that recoupment is not stayed and the trustee takes property subject to
recoupment rights). But see Ohning v. Schneider Nat'l Transcontinental, Inc. (In re Ohning), 57 B.R.
714, 717 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (holding that use of recoupment was an intentional violation of the
automatic stay.).
36. See supra note 31.
37. A "debt" is a liability on a claim. II U.S.C. §§ 101(4), 101(11) (1988).
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claim of the creditor against the debtor,38 and that the debt and the claim
are mutual obligations.39 The mutual debts must arise before the
commencement of the case and the setoff must be valid under state law.4"
Courts generally hold that for claims to be mutual under the Code, the
debts must subsist between the same parties in the same right or capacity
and be of the same kind or quality.4' If the creditor is able to satisfy
these requirements, then the creditor may "obtain full satisfaction of its
claim by extinguishing an equal amount of the creditor's obligation to the
debtor."'42 The allowance of setoff is not automatic but is at the discretion
of the bankruptcy court, applying general principles of equity.43
There are limits, however, on the bank's use of a setoff as a solution to
the administrative freeze and automatic stay problem.' First, the
automatic stay provision applies to a setoff, and requires creditors to obtain
38. A "claim" is broadly defined under the Code as "a right to payment, whether or not such right
is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.. ." II U.S.C. § 10 1(4) (1988).
39. In re Lundell Farms, 86 B.R. 582 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1988); Morristown Lincoln-Mercury
v. Hamilton Bank of Morristown (In re Morristown Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.), 42 B.R 413, 416 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1984).
40. Hecht v. Chemical Bank (In re Hecht), 41 B.R. 701, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Section
553(a) allows a creditor to set off a mutual debt owed by the creditor to the debtor against a claim of
the creditor against the debtor, so long as these mutual debts arose before the commencement of the
case, and so long as the setoff is valid under state law."); In re Academy Answering Servs., Inc., 90
B.R. 294,296 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that a creditor must establish a right to setoff the debts
under nonbankruptcy law); 4 COLLIER, supra note 17, 553.08, at 553-45 (stating that to be eligible
for setoff both the mutual claim of the creditor and debt of the debtor must have arisen prior to the
commencement of the case).
41. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 42 B.R. 443, 449 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) ("Mutuality of
obligation simply means that the creditor is indebted to the debtor who likewise owes a debt to the
creditor, something must be owed by both sides.'). In re Morristown Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 42 B.R.
at 416. Accord Art Metal U.S.A., Inc. v. United States General Servs. Admin. (In re Art Metal U.S.A.,
Inc.), 109 B.R. 74, 78 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989).
42. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 42 B.R. at 448. This ability is criticized as conflicting with the
fundamental policy of distribution because, in effect, the creditor receives a preference. Id. However,
if a setoff is denied, then the creditor pays into the estate the full amount which it owed while receiving
only a pro rata distribution made to all unsecured creditors. Id. The Code avoids this result and retains
the long history of permitting setoff in bankruptcy. In re Academy Answering Services, 90 B.R. at 296.
43. In re Pieri, 86 B.R. 208, 210 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988) (stating that setoff should not be allowed
when it would be inequitable or contrary to public policy).
44. Banks are usually the primary beneficiaries of the right of setoff because deposits are treated
as creating debts owed by the bank to its customer which may be set off against the customer's loan
obligation. Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 3, at 317. These limitations reflect a congressional
purpose to restrict the right of setoff and to treat it as a preference in certain circumstances. See 4
COLLIER, supra note 17, 553.01, at 553-6.
448
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court permission before taking any action against the property of the
estate.45 Second, section 553(b) restricts the right of setoff under state law
and treats the exercise of a setoff as a preference under certain circum-
stances.46 Congress intended to limit the amount a creditor can set off
under state law, so that one creditor could not improve his position at the
expense of unsecured creditors. Section 553(b) takes precedence over any
state law to the contrary.47 Finally, sections 553(a)(2) and 553(a)(3) seek
to prohibit setoff where a deposit is accepted by a creditor with the intent
of applying it to a pre-existing claim against the debtor.48
C. Right to Setoff As a Secured Claim-Section 506
Some courts also believe section 506, the Code's secured claim
provision, provides an answer to the administrative freeze and automatic
stay problem. The Code treats a bank's right to setoff49 as a secured
45. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). However, the stay does not affect creditors' substantive rights. It
simply stays enforcement pending an orderly examination of the debtor's and creditors' rights. See S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837.
46. In re Hecht 41 B.R. 701, 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). The circumstances in which a setoff
will be treated as an avoidable preference by the trustee are when the creditor improves his position
based upon the setoff of a mutual debt within the ninety day period preceding the filing of the petition.
Id. The trustee can recover the amount "by which the insufficiency on the date of setoff is less than
the insufficiency would have been had the setoff occurred ninety days before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition or on the first day after the ninetieth day on which there was an insufficiency." Id.
See H.R REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6145
("The bill also adds the improvement in position test as a limitation. Under this test.., any increase
during the three months before bankruptcy in the amount of the debt owing by the creditor to the debtor
would not be permitted to be offset."). This test was meant to prevent the exercise of the setoff right
from becoming a precipitating event which pushes the debtor into bankruptcy. See AARON, supra note
29, § 10.06; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra, at 186, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6147 ("The result
is to encourage business workouts, by discouraging precipitous action.").
47. See AARON, supra note 29, § 10.06, at 2-3.
48. Section 553(a)(2) prohibits a setoff of a creditor's claim against the debtor when the claim was
acquired from a third party within 90 days before the petition while the debtor was insolvent. I 1 U.S.C.
§ 553(a)(2). Section 553(a)(3) negates the setoff if the debts owed to the debtor from the creditor were
incurred by the creditor for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff within 90 days of filing the
petition while the debtor was insolvent. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a)(3). Further, section 553(c) creates a
presumption that the debtor was insolvent during the 90 day period prior to the filing of the petition.
II U.S.C. § 553(c). Accord Moses v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Moses), 91 B.R. 994, 996-97
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); Kittrell v. State Employees Credit Union (In re Kittrell), 115 B.R. 873, 881
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1990) ("[Ihe setoff exception of§ 553(a) does not apply where a deposit is accepted
or obtained by a credit union with the intent of applying it to a pre-existing claim against the
depositor.").
49. Setoff is defined as "[T]he equitable right to cancel or offset mutual debts or cross demands,
commonly used by a bank in reducing a customer's checking or other deposit account in satisfaction
of a debt the customer owes the bank." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1372 (6th ed. 1990).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
claim in section 506 to the extent of the amount subject to setoff." The
Code's treatment can be criticized because a major tenet of bankruptcy law
is that all creditors are to receive equitable treatment.' By providing for
a setoff right, the Code, in effect, gives the bank, with an otherwise
unsecured claim, a preference over other unsecured creditors.52 However,
because the right to setoff has been so entrenched in the history of
bankruptcy litigation, the drafters felt that it should be maintained.53
Section 363 is closely related to section 506. Under section 363, the
cash in the debtor's account which is subject to the right of setoff by the
bank is "cash collateral."54 Therefore, the money in the account may not
be used unless each entity with an interest in the cash collateral consents,
or unless the court, after notice and hearing, authorizes such use.5
50. 11 U.S.C. § 506 provides:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has
an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim ...
to the extent of the amount subject to setoff... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that
the value of... the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed
claim.
See also Gulfstream Bank, N.A. v. R.C.I. Enters., Inc. (In re R.C.I. Enters., Inc.), 22 B.R. 549, 551
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). In effect, this equates a right of setoff with a lien because the bank holds a
secured claim to the extent of the right to setoff. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 553.15, at 553-70 (15th
ed. 1990).
51. See supra note 16.
52. The legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) provides that a setoff is not to be set aside as
a preferential transfer but is subject to special rules. Sarkis v. American State Bank of Rapid City (In
re Sarkis), 17 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982).
53. A claimant who properly invokes setoff elevates an unsecured claim to a secured position,
thereby receiving a permissible preference over other creditors. However, the right of setoff is based
upon long-recognized rights of mutual debtors and has been embodied in every bankruptcy law the
United States has enacted. See supra note 49-52. The treatment is due, in part, to a belief that injustice
would result from requiring a creditor to pay its indebtedness in full to the state and then to wait in line
to obtain satisfaction of its claim. See Big Bear Supermarket No. 3 v. Princess Banking Corp. (In re
Princess Banking Corp.), 5 B.R. 587, 589 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.
Utica Floor Maintenance, Inc. (In re Utica Floor Maintenance, Inc.), 41 B.R 941, 943 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1984); American Cent. Airlines, Inc. v. United States Dep't. of Transp. (In re American Cent. Airlines,
Inc.), 60 B.R. 587, 589-90 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) provides that: "In this section, 'cash collateral' means cash.., in which
the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest ... ." Commentators have noted that "a
bank stayed from setting off under section 362(a)(7) would be treated as the holder of a secured claim
under section 506(a) to the extent of the deposit account and the deposit account is considered 'cash
collateral' under section 363(a)." 2 COLLIER, supra note 17, 363.02, at 363-416.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2). For a discussion of how a court should reach this decision, see Stephen
A. Stripp, Balancing Of Interests In Orders Authorizing the Use Of Cash Collateral In Chapter 11, 21
SETON HALL L. REV. 562 (1991). The protection is offered in recognition of the risk to a creditor with
an interest in the collateral from its consumption in a rehabilitative effort in bankruptcy. 2 COLLIER,
supra note 17, 363.02, at 363-416. 1990).
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Further, an entity with an interest in the cash collateral may request that the
court condition such use to protect the interest of all creditors.56 Because
the bank has an interest in the cash collateral, it may request adequate
protection for that interest." Adequate protection is not specifically
defined but illustrations of adequate protection are provided by section
36L" s
Banks argue that through section 506, in conjunction with section 363,
Congress approved the use of the administrative freeze on a debtor's
account.59 Section 506, as discussed earlier, provides that a creditor with
a right to setoff is a secured creditor up to the amount of setoff.
61
Furthermore, Section 363(c) operates so that the money in the debtor's
account is treated as cash collateral and may not be used unless the bank
consents or the court authorizes such use.6t  Thus, banks argue that by
56. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). Adequate protection encompasses protecting a secured creditor from
suffering a decline in the value of the collateral during a bankruptcy proceeding. Barclays Bank of New
York, N.A. v. Saypol (In re Saypol), 31 B.R. 796, 799-800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). See In re Certified
Corp., 51 B.R. 768, 771 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985) ("This protection must result in the indubitable
equivalent of a secured creditor's interest in the property.") The trustee has the burden of proof on the
is'que of adequate protection at any hearing under section 363. 2 COLLIER, supra note 17, 363.07, at
363-431.
57. The interest in the collateral is a security interest and, as such, is a property right protected
by the Fifth Amendment from public taking without just compensation. Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
George Ruggiere Chrysler-Plymouth (In re George Ruggiere Chrysler-Plymouth), 727 F.2d 1017, 1019
(5th Cir. 1984). Constitutionally, the bankruptcy court cannot allow use of the cash collateral that
would threaten the creditor's interest. Id. The Code resolves the issue by mandating that the court
condition the use of the secured property (i.e., the cash collateral) "as is necessary to provide adequate
protection." Id.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 361. For a discussion of what constitutes lack of adequate protection, see
Annotation, Wh7at Constitutes Lack Of "Adequate Protection" Of Interest In Property of Estate for
Whqfich Relief May Be Granted From Automatic Stay Provision Of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 USCS
§Z 362(a)), 66 A.L.R. FED. 505 (1982). By adequate protection, Congress contemplated "that which
'will result in the realization by the [secured creditor] of the value of its interest in the property."' In
re Saypol. 31 B.R. at 801 (quoting H.R. REt'. No. 575, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296).
Most courts find adequate protection as long as the creditor's interests are preserved at "status quo,"
or can be protected from diminution, In re Triplett, 87 B.R. 25, 26 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988). In a
bank context, adequate protection is that which insures the bank of "payment of the portion of the debt
that is on deposit with the bank." See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6146.
59. See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. Edgins (In re Edgins), 36 B.R. 480,
482-83 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984).
60. See supra note 50.
61. Zceway Corp. v. Rio Salado Bank (In re Zeeway Corp.), 71 B.R. 210, 211 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1987) ("The Court may allow the debtor to use cash collateral after notice and hearing and upon
providing adequate protection for the creditor's interest."). Id. The debtor, on the other hand, must
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placing a freeze on the debtor's account banks are merely satisfying the
Code's policy and protecting their interest to prevent the deprivation of
cash collateral.62
Further, section 363(e) grants the bank, as a secured creditor, the right
to petition for adequate protection as a condition to use of cash collater-
al.63 The automatic stay will be lifted under section 362(d) upon motion
by the bank unless adequate protection is provided.' If the bank cannot
propose some form of relief that will preserve the secured creditor's interest in the collateral and will
effectively compensate the secured creditor for any loss of value. See In re EES Lambert Assocs., 62
B.R. 328, 343 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1986).
Jack Williams proposes that section 363(c) provides the appropriate analysis for the administrative
freeze problem. Williams, supra note 8, at 54. Mr. Williams states that this section dictates that a
freeze should be allowed because it furthers the requirement that a debtor is to provide adequate
protection for the creditor's interest in the cash collateral. Id. at 61. Mr. Williams' analysis is flawed.
First, as Mr. Williams recognizes, section 363(c) applies only in business reorganization situations.
Id. at 60. But, he argues that the section should be broadly construed to provide creditors with adequate
protection in Chapter 13 cases as well. Id. at 60-61. This analysis fails to consider that the creditor
is not denied the right to adequate protection when a freeze is denied. The creditor can move for ex
parte relief under either section 362(f) or 363(e) should it feel its interest is not protected. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 362(f), 363(e) (1988).
Second, Mr. Williams does not adequately rebut the objection that section 362(a)(3) prohibits any
act to exercise control over the debtor's property. Mr. Williams merely states that a reading of the
section which would prohibit the freeze would endanger many provisions in the Code which protect
creditors. Id. at 62. This argument is unpersuasive because it fails to consider policy justifications for
treating a specific act as violative of this section. Mr. Williams emphasizes the creditor's interests
without considering the competing interests of the debtor.
In conclusion, Mr. Williams analysis is too slanted in favor of creditors' rights. Mr. Williams states
that the debtor's avenue to alleviate harm caused by the administrative freeze is granted by section
363(c)(2): that the debtor must request use of the cash collateral from a court. Id. at 63. He bases this
conclusion on the right of a creditor to adequate protection for its interest. Id.
This approach ignores the reality that in a reorganization, the debtor's need for the cash collateral
is paramount. By refusing to credit the debtor's concern, Mr. Williams fails to consider that in certain
situations it is appropriate to require the creditor to seek the methods provided by section 362(o and
363(e) to protect its interest as opposed to requiring the debtor to seek relief.
The Williams Article strikes this author as treating the creditor as an unprotected victim. The
creditor is not immune from attack for using the administrative freeze. The freeze embodies an extra-
judicial determination of a right to setoff. This action outside the judicial framework is as open to
attack as a debtor's use of cash collateral, arguably, in violation of section 363(c). Mr. Williams,
however, does not discuss this aspect of the problem.
62. The policy is necessary because "[]ash collateral is a unique form of collateral that requires
special protection since it is most likely to be consumed during the reorganization process and is at
times subject to change on an almost daily basis." In re EES Lambert Assocs., 62 B.R. at 343.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988).
64. "[U]se [of cash collateral] must be prohibited or conditioned as is necessary to provide
adequate protection of the secured creditor's interest." In re EES Lambert Assocs., 62 B.R. at 343.
This concept is based upon the realities of a bankruptcy case. The use of cash collateral is essential
to the success of a reorganization. However, this use diminishes the value of the security provided the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/9
1994] ADMINISTRATIVE FREEZE 453
freeze the account, then the right to lift the automatic stay becomes
meaningless because cash can be used without adequate protection. 5
Although the banks' arguments in favor of allowing an administrative
freeze are powerful, they conflict with other Code policies. In a reorgani-
zation case for example, the debtor may need access to the cash collateral
in order to meet current operating expenditures.66 To allow the freeze
would frustrate the debtor's interest in direct violation of the policies of the
Code.67  Further, section 363(c) only applies to the trustee. 8  While the
bank would be furthering the overall policy of section 363 by placing an
administrative freeze on the debtor's accounts, the explicit mandate of
section 362 should outweigh this "good citizen" argument. 69  Finally, the
argument in favor of the right to adequate protection can be countered just
as the argument in favor of the right to setoff may be countered. The Code
requires that the court determine the right to setoff.7 ° Because it is only
by a right to setoff that a bank has a right to adequate protection,7" it does
no disservice to the underlying policies of the Code to deny the bank an
uncontested right to freeze.
creditor, thus eroding its secured position. This dilemma was addressed by allowing a creditor whose
cash collateral is to be used to request that the court condition the use upon provision of adequate
protection. See Worcester County Nat'l Bank v. Xinde Int'l, Inc. (In re Xinde Int'l, Inc.), 13 B.R. 212
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
65. This contention bolstered by statements of individual legislators concerning the use of cash
collateral. See 124 CONG. REc. 32,396 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Don Edwards) ("The trustee or debtor
in possession may use, sell, or lease cash collateral in the ordinary course of business only 'after notice
and a hearing."); 124 CONG. REc. 32,419 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Caldwell Butler) ("The debtor in
possession may use all collateral in the ordinary course of business without a hearing except for 'cash
collateral' which requires the opportunity for a hearing except in emergencies.").
66. See Stripp, supra note 55, at 565-66.
67. The stay is meant to provide breathing room for the debtor and a denial of collateral in a
reorganization would prevent this. See Thorne, supra note 34, at 188.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (1988).
69. Section 362 provides that the automatic stay applies to "any act to obtain possession of
property of the estate .. " 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1988). This specific language and the overall policy
of debtor repose in the stay would trump any argument focused on the furtherance of the section 363
policy.
70. Section 362 stays an exercise of setoff. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7). Section 362(d) allows for
relief from the stay if the court determines that the bank is not adequately protected. I 1 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(1). Any relief from the stay must be accomplished by a court order. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 363
(1988).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988) ("In this section, 'cash collateral' means... deposit accounts...
whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest ... ")
(emphasis added).
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D. Turnover Provisions of the Code
Finally, section 542(c) may provide justification for the bank's use of a
freeze. Under section 542(b), a bank with a right of setoff need not turn
over property of the estate to the trustee.72 However, section 542(c)
implicitly makes a creditor who has knowledge of the filing of the
bankruptcy case liable for turning over property of the estate to an entity
other than a trustee.
73
Because section 543(c) makes a bank which has knowledge of the
bankruptcy petition accountable for estate property which it transfers,
74
some commentators argue that a bank must be allowed to freeze a debtor's
account to prevent liability.' This contention is met by section 542(b)
which does not require an entity with a right to setoff to turn over money
payable to the debtor.76  The bank, which has a right to setoff, would not
be violating this section by allowing withdrawals from the debtor's account
because the funds would not be subject to turnover.77
Unfortunately, banks may not rely solely on section 542(c) to justify the
use of the administrative freeze. Section 542 provides no independent
justification for the bank's actions. Therefore, the bank must look
72. 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1988) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity that owes a debt that is
property of the estate and that is matured, payable on demand, or payable on order, shall pay
such debt to, or on the order of, the trustee, except to the extent that such debt may be offset
under section 553 of this title against a claim against the debtor.
73. II U.S.C. § 542(c) (1988). Importantly, under this section, if the bank has knowledge of the
filing, it will not be protected. The bank will be liable to the estate for the amount of money which
is turned over.
74. Id. This section states that "an entity that has neither actual notice nor actual knowledge of
the commencement of the case concerning the debtor may transfer property of the estate ... ." Id.
The clear implication is that an entity with notice or knowledge may not transfer property and would
be accountable to the trustee, under section 542(a), to turn over the property of the estate which it
controls.
75. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 8, at 45 ("[O]ne implication of section 542(c) is that if the
creditor transfers property of the estate after it receives notice of the filing it does so at it's own peril.
In order to protect itself from liability ... the creditor has no alternative but to freeze the debtor's
account.").
76. However, section 542(b) also provides support for use of the administrative freeze. The
section requires any entity owing a debt to the debtor to pay such debt except to the extent that the debt
is subject to setoff. I 1 U.S.C. § 542(b). Thus, it could be argued that the Code recognizes a difference
between the mere withholding of funds and the exercise of the setoff right. Therefore, an entity
claiming a right of setoff may retain funds via an administrative freeze until its setoff right is
determined. See 4 COLLER, supra note 17, 553.15, at 553-584, 587.
77. 11 U.S.C § 542(d) (1988). See also Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 3, at 323 (stating that
turnover of funds subject to a setoff right would not violate § 542(b)).
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elsewhere to justify its use of the freeze.
E. Conclusion
The discussion above illustrates that applying the conflicting provisions
of the Code to an administrative freeze is a complex and difficult task.
Unfortunately, both the language and policy of these sections provide no
clear answer to the questions raised by a bank's use of the administrative
freeze when read in isolation. Any argument in favor of one interpretation
may be effectively attacked by reference to another section or policy.
Therefore, the problem should be addressed through a functional approach,
taking into account the differing contexts in which the freeze may be
maintained. As will be shown in Part III, however, most courts have
refused to take such an approach.
III. DISCUSSION OF CASES INTERPRETING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
FREEZE
A. Cases Holding That the Freeze Violates the Stay
In In re Wildcat Construction Co.,78 the bankruptcy court held that the
freeze violated the stay.79 The court noted that through use of a freeze,
the bank would be making an extra-judicial determination concerning its
secured status and the identification of the funds in the debtor's account as
cash collateral."0
The court also noted that section 362 in effect provides a "stalemate"
which protects both parties and makes an administrative freeze unneces-
sary."' The Code's automatic stay prohibits the bank from setting off.
And, because the debtor must obtain the court's permission before using
cash collateral, 2 the Code also prohibits the debtor from using the funds.
In other words, if the bank is correct about the funds, then the debtor may
not use the cash collateral. However, if the bank is wrong, then it had no
right to preclude access in the first place. In either scenario, the court
found that the freeze was unnecessary.83
78. 57 B.R. 981 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986).
79. Id. at 984-87.
80. Id. at 986.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
19941
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In In re Kenney 's Franchise Corp.,84 the court held that the freeze was
a violation of both the spirit and purpose of the automatic stay provision."
The court determined that section 362's language is broad and encompass-
ing in its prohibition.86 Therefore, the freeze upsets the congressional
policy of the orderly administration of bankruptcy cases.87 The court
emphasized that the freeze was a refusal to recognize the debtor's rights in
the account and therefore violated the bank's duty to honor the debtor's
requests. 8 The administrative freeze contravened the automatic stay
policies of orderly administration and debtor repose.89
In In re Quality Interiors, Inc.,0 the court also found that the freeze
violated the stay.9' First, the court agreed with the discussion of the
automatic stay and administrative freeze issue in In re Homan.92 The
Homan court concluded that the creditor-bank cannot assert an interest in
the funds on deposit and resort to self-help to preserve that claimed interest,
because the Code demands that the creditor initiate a filing to obtain relief
from the stay.93 The Homan court noted that the freeze creates significant
economic havoc for a debtor attempting to reorganize under Chapter 11 or
12 and causes even more disastrous consequences for an individual
attempting to obtain relief under Chapter 13.
Second, the Quality Interiors court concurred with Homan's dismissal of
the argument that a bank is merely acting in accordance with the Code by
preventing the debtor in possession's use of cash collateral through use of
the freeze.' The Homan court ruled that the argument could be persua-
sive in a Chapter 11 filing but is not equally applicable to Chapter 13
cases.96 While the Homan case was a Chapter 11 case, the court refused
84. 12 B.R. 390 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981), rev'd, Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Cent. Fid. Bank, 22
B.R. 747 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982).
85. Id. at 394.
86. Id. at 391-92.
87. Id. at 394.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 127 B.R. 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991).
91. Id. at 395.
92. 116 B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)
93. Id. at 603.
94. Id.
95. 127 B.R. at 394-95.
96. "[W]hile such an argument could be persuasive in a Chapter 11 proceeding, this argument...
is not equally applicable to the vast majority of Chapter 13 cases, which are consumer, not business,
filings." Id. at 395 (quoting In re Homan, 116 B.R. at 604).
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to recognize that a bank is exempt from conformity with other provisions
of the Code simply because it is acting in conformity with one policy of
the Code.97
Third, the Quality Interiors court noted that the freeze is absolute,
applying to the entire account.9" However, the bank's security interest in
the account extended only as far as its right to setoff.99 Therefore, the
freeze violated the broad principles of the automatic stay provision."°
The court concluded by observing that the case did not present a
situation which required a financial institution to seek self-help.'' The
court referred to Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3) which provides for ex parte
relief from the stay where immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result. 2 While the filing procedure could be burdensome
on the financial institution, it ensures a judicial determination of the rights
of the parties and is consistent with the language of the automatic stay. 3
In In re Rio,"° the court held that an administrative freeze upsets the
97. 116 B.11 at 395. This ruling of the Quality Interiors court is open to debate. While the court
correctly concluded that the provisions are in conflict, it implicitly held that the stay policy was more
important than the cash collateral provision. Given the importance of the stay provision, this may be
defensible. However, the court provided no rationale for its holding. It could very well be that
compliance with the cash collateral provision should exempt the bank from compliance with other
policies. The court's holding was conclusory and gave short treatment to the competing arguments.
98. 127 B.R. at 395.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court observed:
In the event that the bank's right to setoff is less than the balance of the deposit account, a
bank which unilaterally freezes the debtor's account reaches far beyond its rights in the cash
collateral of the debtor. In this situation, the bank's exercise of control over property of the
estate would be ... clearly within the scope of actions prohibited by the automatic stay. This
is an example of the type of "self-help".. . which the Homan ... court[] sought to avoid.
Id.
101. Id. ("[T]his court, like Judge Waldron [writer of the opinion in Homan], 'is not persuaded that
the Code sections under discussion place a financial institution in a situation from which it cannot
escape without resort to self-help.") (quoting In re Homan, 116 B.R. at 605).
102. Id.
103. Id. This case reflects the problems which can occur with individual, extra-judicial
determination concerning rights to funds. The debtor had transferred money from a general account
to a payroll account. Id. at 392. This constituted an unauthorized use of cash collateral in violation
of section 363 and rendered irrelevant the debtor's argument that, under Ohio law, the creditor had no
right to setoff in the payroll account. Id. at 392-93. The court took the debtor's motion for a release
of the administrative hold on the payroll account as a motion for use of cash collateral and found that
the creditor had previously consented to such use. Id. at 395. The complexity of the arguments
demonstrates the inadequacy of personal determinations concerning rights such as use of the freeze.
104. 55 B.R. 814 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1985), rev'd, Rio v. Army Aviation Ctr. Fed. Credit Union,
82 B.R. 138 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986).
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balance between debtor and creditor established by Congress in section
362.105 Creditors were broadly stayed from any act to exercise control
over property of the estate and the court refused to shift the balance by
countenancing use of the freeze."0 6 Because the scope of the stay is
broad, the court believed that exceptions should be narrowly construed,
especially when these exceptions could harm the debtor's rehabilitation
efforts.1
0 7
Finally, in In re Executive Associates, Inc.,' °8 the court held that a
freeze results in an unauthorized interference with the property of the
debtor without leave of court.'0 9 The court advised that if the bank
believes that a debtor is using cash collateral without having provided
adequate protection, the bank should seek relief from the court."'
Moreover, the court posited that if creditors were allowed to determine
unilaterally that they possessed a setoff right which the debtor was
violating, the orderly administration of the estate would be upset."' The
court saw the administrative freeze as equivalent to the bank granting itself
an ex parte temporary restraining order in contravention of the Code."2
The above cases demonstrate that the courts which hold that the
administrative freeze violates the automatic stay rely upon the broad
application of the stay's policy and language."3 These courts consider
the freeze to be an unwarranted, extra-judicial determination which
Congress sought to avoid via the stay provision and other specific
provisions in the Code allowing for relief from the stay."4 The cases
stress the need for an orderly administration of the estate, especially to
prevent interruption of the debtor's business in Chapter 11 reorganizations,
which the freeze is said to disrupt." s
105. Id. at 818.
106. Id. at 818-19.
107. Id. at 819.
108. 24 B.R. 171 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982).
109. Id. at 172.
110. Id. at 173.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., First Connecticut Small Business Inv. Co. v. Bank of Boston Connecticut (In re First
Connecticut Small Business Inv. Co.), 118 B.R. 179, 182-83 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (holding that
because the automatic stay is a crucial provision of the Code which should be construed broadly,
exceptions are to be read narrowly.).
114. See, e.g., In re Executive Assocs., Inc., 24 B.R. 171, 173 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); In re
Quality Interiors, Inc., 127 B.R. 391, 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991).
115. See, e.g., In re Quality Interiors, Inc., 127 B.R. at 394.
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The anti-freeze cases can be criticized in two ways. First, the courts fail
to consider that the stay should act merely to delay the enforcement of the
creditor's rights pending an examination of the parties' respective
positions.116  Because the decisions would allow for dissipation of
collateral when it is unwarranted, they violate this policy of the automatic
stay."7  Second, holding that an administrative freeze violates the stay
ignores the policy of rewarding a creditor who declines to set off before a
petition is filed.1 By preventing the creditor from using a freeze, the
courts create an incentive for the creditor to exercise the setoff right pre-
petition, which could precipitate a bankruptcy."9  In general, the cases
which refuse to allow an administrative freeze are too debtor-oriented
without taking into account the creditor's interest.
B. Cases Which Hold That the Freeze Does Not Violate the Stay
In In re Crispell,"2° the court ruled that the right to freeze an account
is implied by reading sections 362, 542 and 553 together.'' However,
the court found that a continuation would have the same effect upon a
debtor as if the steps for a setoff had been carried out. 2   Therefore, the
court held that if within seven days following the imposition of the freeze,
the creditor did not turn over the funds to the trustee or request the court
to allow an exercise of the right of setoff, the freeze would be a willful
116. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). See Johnson & O'Leary, supra note 14, at 602-03; Williams, supra
note 8, at 55-56.
117. By disallowing a freeze in a liquidation proceeding, the courts would allow debtors to
withdraw finds from their accounts. This would affect creditors' setoff rights because their security
interests in the accounts would be diminished. This substantive effect should not be the result of
applying the statute. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
118. See Williams, supra note 8, at 56 ("[T]his line of cases completely ignores the Code's
undeniable policy of rewarding a creditor who declines to setoff before the bankruptcy petition is
filed.").
119. See id. ("[Tlhis line of cases promotes prepetition setoff."). Section 553(b) weakens this
argument because it allows a trustee to recover the amount offset within 90 days preceding bankruptcy
subject to the improvement in position test. 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988).
120. 73 B.R- 375 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987)
121. 73 B.R. at 379. The court noted that a bank's right to setoff is specifically recognized by
section 553(a). Id. Moreover, section 542(b) permitted the bank to except funds subject to the right
of setoff from turnover to the trustee. Id. Further, the freeze did not amount to a setoff because the
bank did not even decide to exercise its right to setoff by the freeze. Id. The clear conclusion to be
drawn was that a freeze is recognized by the Code. Id.
122. Id.
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violation of the stay."
In In re Carpenter,24 the court reached a conclusion in accord with the
Crispell court's holding. The court found that the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781" indicated that there is little justifica-
tion for applying the automatic stay to setoffs in liquidation cases.1
6
Therefore, applying the stay to a freeze, which is merely a method to
protect setoff rights, would not be required.2 7  The court, however,
conditioned this right to freeze upon the creditor-bank seeking relief
promptly after its imposition. 21 The court concluded by stating that if
banks could not freeze, they would have to make frantic ex parte motions
for relief or wait while funds were dissipated from the account. 29
123. Id. at 379-80. In applying the announced rule to the case at hand, the court held that the
freeze did indeed violate the stay. However, because the case was one of first impression and because
the bank was not unreasonable in turning over the funds to the debtor beyond seven days after the
freeze and then requesting an order prohibiting use of the cash collateral, the court would not deem the
violation willful. Id. at 380. Thus, the bank avoided liability for punitive damages, attorneys' fees or
contempt of court. Id.
The case also provides another example of the problems with unilateral determination of the right
to setoff. The court denied a motion to alter the judgment on the debtor's argument that the bank knew
it had no right to setoff and thus its freeze was a willful violation. 73 B.R. at 381. The court found
that the bank had not analyzed the debtor's deposits and thus had no knowledge of whether the deposits
consisted of prebankruptcy or postbankruptcy earnings. Id. Therefore, the bank did not have the
requisite knowledge for a willful violation of the stay. Id. To the extent that the bank was given no
duty to investigate, this result is debatable. If the court would allow the bank the right to initially freeze
for seven days before moving the court to exercise a setoff or turning over the funds to the trustee, then
the court should have required at least a reasonable investigation by the bank to ascertain if it had the
right to setoff. Such investigation would be consistent with the policy behind the automatic stay
provision of section 362. See supra notes 14-15. To the extent that a bank is unreasonably in error,
the court's decision allows an unjustified interference with the debtor's right to the funds.
124. 14 B.R. 405 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
125. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988)).
126. 14 B.R. at 407.
127. Id.
128. Id. The court noted that Congress had distinguished between withholding payment and the
exercise of a setoff right in section 542. The phrase "may be offset" in section 542 contemplated that
property to which the right of setoff existed, but which had not yet been offset, could be withheld from
turnover to the trustee. Id. This result provided further support for the court because the Code
specifically barred setoffs. Id. In contrast, the court's assertion that relief from the stay must be sought
was not explained in the opinion. A logical conclusion given the court's reliance on the distinction
between withholding and setoff is that, like the Crispell court, In re Crispell, 73 B.R. 375 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1987), the court believed that continuing the freeze amounted to a setoff.
129. 14 B.R. at 407-08. See also In re Gillis, 92 B.R. 461, 470-71 (Bankr. D. Haw., 1988) ("If a
bank 'freezes' or withholds funds subject to a valid setoff, the bank must promptly file a complaint
seeking relief from the automatic stay in order to avoid violating the stay.'). The Gillis court reasoned
that to put the burden on the debtor to take action to recover the property, if no setoff right existed,
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In Air Atlanta v. National Bank of Georgia,3 ' the court also held that
the freeze did not violate the automatic stay.13 1 The court first stated that
if a bank transfers property of the estate after it receives notice of the
filing, it does so at its own peril. 32  The turnover would violate section
542's requirement that all property of the estate be immediately turned over
to the trustee or the debtor in possession. 33
Moreover, the court reasoned that the clear preference which the Code
allows creditors regarding their setoff rights dictated the result.134  This
was true even if the freeze and subsequent setoff of bank deposits
jeopardized a debtor's ability to reorganize. 35
In In re Hoffrnan,136 focusing on the bank's dilemma under section
542, the court held that the freeze did not violate the stay.137  The court
further noted that the effect of the freeze is to maintain the status quo.
t31
Therefore, the freeze is not an attempt to improve the bank's right to
distribution of estate assets. 139  By implication, it would not violate one
would subject the debtor to the very pressure which the stay was designed to eliminate. 92 B.R. at 471.
130. 81 B.R. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
131. Id. at 725 ('[T]he court is of the opinion that the approach used by the bankruptcy court in
this case is the correct one, i.e., that an administrative freeze does not constitute a violation of the stay
in these circumstances.'), Air Atlanta filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11. Id. After the bank
learned of the filing of the bankruptcy, it refused to honor any checks drawn by Air Atlanta on its
accounts, through the use of a freeze. Id. The bank moved for relief from the stay to set off two days
later and Air Atlanta filed a complaint seeking turnover of the funds in the account to it as debtor in
possession. Id. The bankruptcy court held that the freeze did not violate the stay. Id.
132. Id. at 726.
133. Id. at 725-26.
134. Id. at 726.
135. Id. See also Stann v. Mid Am. Credit Union, 39 B.R. 246, 248 (D. Kan. 1984). The Stann
court argued that the freeze does not violate the stay because it is not a setoff for three reasons: (1)
a setoff requires an overt act, while a freeze is merely inaction on the part of the bank; (2) a setoff
adjusts the rights of the parties but a freeze does not; (3) the freeze is necessary to secure the bank's
setoff right by preventing withdrawal of funds. 39 B.R. at 247-48.
This decision may be criticized for providing too narrow a focus. Even if the freeze did not amount
to a setoff, it could still violate other provisions of the automatic stay. However, the court did not
address this possibility.
136. 51 B.R. 42 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1985)
137. Id. at 46. The court noted that if a bank transfers property of the estate after learning of the
filing of a bankruptcy petition, it could be subject to liability to the estate for the amount transferred.
Id. Section 549 authorizes the trustee to set aside unauthorized transfers of property of the estate. Id.
Section 542 only protects a transfer without notice and in good faith. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned
that by honoring withdrawals on the account, the bank would be violating the Code's turnover
provisions. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
462 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 72:441
policy behind the automatic stay provision-to provide for the orderly
administration of the estate.140
The court in Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bankt4t
focused on the cash collateral provisions of section 363. The court noted
that section 363(c)(2) "provides that the trustee may not use cash collateral
without the authorization of the bankruptcy court, following notice and
hearing."'142 Therefore, the bank acted properly in not allowing the debtor
to use the checking account without prior court approval. 43  The court
concluded that: (a) the funds in the bank account were cash collateral; (b)
accordingly, Kenney's could not use the proceeds of the account without
the bank's consent or the approval of the court; and (c) as no consent or
approval was given, the bank's actions in freezing the funds until an
adequate protection hearing were entirely proper.' 44
The court in In re Lee145 focused on the adequate protection feature of
section 363. The court held that because the bank holds a secured claim
140. Id. The court's assertion was not entirely correct. While it is true that the freeze does not
result in affirmative activity in the account, it does disturb what would occur had the freeze not been
imposed. Without a freeze, the debtor would have access to the funds in the account, and the bank
would have to file for relief from the stay in order to set off and protect its interest. Indeed, the freeze
is an attempt to improve the bank's right to distribution by protecting its setoff rights. Of course, the
use of setoff itself violates the tenet of equality of treatment to unsecured creditors, but it is justified
by its long history in the Code. To go beyond the right to setoff by freezing the account is an
expansion of the setoff exception to the general rule of no preferences for unsecured creditors and
should be limited in scope as argued in this Note. Accord Heckathorn Constr. Co. v. Bass Mechanical
Contractors, Inc. (In re Bass Mechanical Contractors, Inc.), 84 B.R. 1009, 1022-23 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
1988) (noting that placing a freeze on a debtor's account operates to preserve the debtor's account and
is not a direct or indirect attempt to improve the bank's right to a distribution of assets); li re Learn,
95 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) ("[Ain administrative freeze simply preserves the status quo
until the rights of the parties may be judicially determined.")
141. 22 B.R. 747 (W.D. Va. 1982) (overruling In re Kenney's Franchise Corp., 12 B.RL 390, 394
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981)).
142. Id. at 749.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 750. Accord In re Owens-Peterson, 39 B.R. 186 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984). The Owens-
Peterson court held that while the result could potentially impose a burden on a reorganization debtor,
the result is inescapable once the court determines that the bank account constitutes cash collateral under
section 363. 39 B.R. at 189. The court concluded that a freeze must be allowed pending final
resolution by the court on a motion by the bank for relief from the automatic stay to complete setoff
or a motion by the debtor to use cash collateral or a complaint for the turnover of funds. Id.
This restrictive approach to the freeze is criticized in part V of this Note. See also In re Gazelle,
Inc., 17 B.R. 617, 620 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (holding that freezing the account was entirely proper
because funds were cash collateral, the use of which was prohibited absent bank consent or court
authorization).
145. 40 B.R. 123 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).
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under section 506 to the extent of its right to setoff, the trustee or debtor
in possession has no right to the funds unless the trustee or debtor
convinces the court that the creditor is adequately protected under section
363.146 The court further noted that requiring a turnover without a court
order makes no sense because it allows the funds in the account to be
dissipated without providing the bank with its right to adequate protec-
tion.'47 In these cases, it is proper to mandate that the trustee or debtor
in possession move for use of the funds rather than subject the creditor to
the possible risk of losing its security interest. 4
Similarly, in In re Edgins,'49 the court argued that disallowing the
administrative freeze placed the burden upon the wrong party.'50
Creditors with a valid setoff right should not be required to turn over the
funds and then subsequently be required to obtain an order to preclude the
debtor from dissipating the account. 5' The court noted that a contrary
finding would result in the shield of section 362 being used as a sword to
divest the bank of its legitimate interest in the funds pursuant to its setoff
right.
5 2
146. Id. at 126.
147. Id.
148. Id. The court further recognized that a Chapter 7 debtor is not the proper party to raise a
violation of section 362(a)(7) [the automatic stay of a setoff]. The court's rationale was that the
provision was meant to make funds available for the operation of a business in a reorganization case.
Id. The author believes that this reading of the Code is entirely correct. A liquidated debtor has no
interest in the operation of a business because there is no business left to run.
149. 36 B.R. 480 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 484. The court first concluded that section 542(d) counteracts the bank's action to
preclude the debtor's use of the funds pending a determination of the bank's right to setoff. Id. at 483.
The court then stated that section 363 did not require that the bank bring an action to deter payment
of account funds. Id. Therefore, the burden should be on the debtor to bring a claim for use of the
funds. Id. at 484.
151. Id.
152. Id. Accordingly, the bank's reaction to the problem was a proper attempt to maintain the
status quo and to create a balance pending prompt action by either party to resolve the rights of the
parties to the funds. Id. at 484-85.
The court appears to have agreed with the Wildcat court, In re Wildcat Const. Co., 57 B.R. 981
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1986), that the statute creates a stalemate. Id at 483. The court noted that the Code
does not specify whether the creditor should bring an action for relief from the stay or the debtor should
bring a motion for use of cash collateral to "break what appears to be a statutory logjam." Id.
However, the court did not consider this sufficient protection for the bank and thus allowed the bank
to freeze to protect its interest. Id.
In addition, the court stated that it would be appropriate for the debtor to move for use of the funds
as cash collateral under section 363. Id. Because the debtor has knowledge of the impending
bankruptcy and control of subsequent events, the debtor must initiate proceedings to determine the
proper disposition of the funds. Id. at 483-84.
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In In re Williams,53 the court held that the solution to the problem of
the administrative freeze lay in applying a longstanding rule of statutory
construction.1 54 The rule holds that where there is a specific provision and
a general one in the same statute, the specific provision controls and the
general one should be limited to those cases which do not fall within the
language of the specific provision.'55 In this case, the court stated that
the specific permission granted to the creditor to retain funds subject to set
off in section 542 should prevail over the general prohibitions in section
362.156 Therefore, the court concluded that a freeze should be allowed
until an order is entered providing for the disposition of the funds.' 57
In summary, the cases holding that the freeze does not violate the stay
focus on either the dissipation of the bank's cash collateral and resulting
destruction of the setoff right 58 or on the dilemma the bank encounters
if no freeze is allowed. 59 In many contexts, the cases provide the
This reading is open to attack as being contrary to the Code's policy of debtor repose. To the extent
that the bank wishes to prohibit the use of the funds, an equally persuasive argument is that the burden
should be on the bank. The bank is trying to avoid the effect of the stay so it should be required to
move for relief. This result could be seen as mandated by section 362's provision for relief from the
stay. See Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp. v. Crestar Bank (In re Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp.), 91 B.R. 392
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988). See also Citizen Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 138 B.R. 792, 794 (Bankr.
D. Md. 1992) (arguing that the freeze is the only sensible procedural approach because the bank's right
to setoff would be rendered meaningless through dissipation of the funds prior to a motion for relief
from the stay); Rio v. Army Aviation Ctr. Fed. Credit Union, 82 B.R. 138, 144 (Bankr. M.D. Ala.
1986) ("[T]he imposition of the administrative hold on the account of the Debtors was a reasonable
means by which the Credit Union could assure that the Bankruptcy Court's options would be preserved
and that the Credit Union's right in the collateral would be adequately protected.")
153. 61 B.R. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
154. Id. at 573.
155. Id. (quoting 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 257 (1974)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 17, 553.15, at 553-86 ("[l]t is argued [by courts allowing the
administrative freeze], the Code contemplates that the debtor must apply to the court before it can use
funds on deposit.., to the extent that the bank may have a right to set off such funds.'). "Section
363(c)(2) provides that the trustee may not use cash collateral unless the other entity with an interest
consents or unless the court authorizes such use after notice and hearing." Id.
159. If the bank cannot freeze, several problems may result. First, if the bank turns over the funds
in the account, it could be liable under section 542. That section implicitly makes an entity with
knowledge of the bankruptcy filing that turns over funds belonging to the estate liable for the amount
which is turned over. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (c). Thus, it could be argued, the bank cannot avoid this result
by applying an administrative freeze.
Further, the bank would lose its right to setoff because funds have been removed from the account,
and the bank would lose its right to adequate protection for use of those funds. Both of these outcomes
arguably violate the Code provisions, section 553 and 363, which recognize those creditor rights.
Finally, the bank would be helping the debtor violate the Code by allowing use of cash collateral
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appropriate balance between the conflicting interests of the creditor seeking
a right to setoff and the debtor whose funds are subject to the setoff. The
creditor's interest is protected while the debtor can seek permission to use
the cash collateral by filing a motion pursuant to section 363(e).
In other situations, however, the arguments in favor of the administrative
freeze lose their force. For example, in a reorganization context, the right
of a debtor to obtain the funds to meet operating expenses should trump the
concerns of the bank. The debtor should be able to tap as many resources
as possible to obtain cash in order to reorganize successfully. The pro-
freeze cases would make it less likely that a debtor would be rehabilitated,
to the detriment of all parties. Allowing a freeze would necessitate the
debtor's seeking approval of use of the funds, and this would be too
lengthy a delay.
The statutory construction approach of In re Williams160 may also be
attacked. Although the court properly noted that a specific provision
controls a more general one, an equally important rule of statutory
construction states that provisions should be construed as consistent with
one another.t6 ' Section 542(b) merely states that a creditor need not turn
over funds to the trustee who has a right to setoff.62 Section 542(b) does
not allow a creditor to act unilaterally to prevent the debtor from accessing
those funds.' 63 Therefore, the section does not permit action by the
creditor, which arguably comes within the prohibition of the automatic stay,
because there is no conflict with section 362."6 Thus, there is no conflict
which would mandate the rule utilized by the Williams court.
165
IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S NOVEL SOLUTION IN IN RE PATTERSON
In In re Patterson,'66 a credit union's loan to Chapter 13 debtors was
without consent or authorization. This argument, however, is the bank's weakest because it is not the
creditor's obligation to ensure compliance with the Code provisions.
160. 61 B.R. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
161. See First Connecticut Small Business Inv. Co. v. Bank of Boston Connecticut (In re First
Connecticut Small Business Inv. Co.), 118 B.R. 179, 182 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) ("Whenever possible,
statutory provisions should be construed so as to be consistent with each other.") (citing Citizens to
Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1988). See In re First Connecticut Small Business Inv. Co., 118 B.R. at
182.
163. In re First Connecticut Small Business Inv. Co., 118 B.1L at 182.
164. Id. at 182-83.
165. Id. at 183-84.
166. 967 F.2d 505 (llth Cir. 1992).
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secured by the debtors' checking and savings accounts.t67 Because the
outstanding loan exceeded the balance in these accounts, the credit union
applied an administrative freeze when it learned that the debtors filed for
bankruptcy.'68 The credit union justified its freeze by stating that the
freeze merely protected the credit union's right to setoff, which is preserved
under the Code. Therefore, the freeze did not violate the automatic
stay.169 The right to setoff, the credit union argued, would be an empty
right if the debtors could draw on the account and destroy the creditor's
security.170
The court joined the cases holding that the freeze violates the automatic
stay and held that the freeze violates the policy of the Code.' 7 1 The court
argued that section 553 preserves the right to setoff only to the extent that
the right is valid, and the Code sets forth the procedure for the bankruptcy
court to determine whether a creditor is entitled to set off.72  Thus,
freezing the account to protect a valid right of setoff only begs the question
whether there is a valid right. The court further noted that although
167. Id. at 507. The plaintiffs had joined the B.F. Goodrich Employees Federal Credit Union,
which maintained the plaintiffs' savings and checking accounts and to which they were indebted on a
loan. Id. The note on the loan provided that the Pattersons' accounts served as security for the loan.
Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 508.
170. Id. at 509. In response to the Credit Union's actions, the plaintiffs filed two proceedings
against the Credit Union: first, they requested a turnover of funds frozen by the Credit Union; and
second, they moved for an injunction restraining the Union from closing their accounts. Id. at 508.
The Credit Union responded, moving to lift the stay, in order to apply the assets in the frozen accounts
to the plaintiffs' loan obligation. Id. The plaintiffs eventually consented to this motion and withdrew
their motion for the turnover of funds. Id. Subsequently, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to
restrain the Credit Union and awarded damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs for the Credit
Union's violation of the automatic stay. Id. The Credit Union appealed this ruling to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, which affirmed the bankruptcy court. Id.
171. Id. at 510. The court specifically found a violation of section 362(a)(3) because the freeze
constituted an act to exereise control over the property of the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 511-12. The
freeze deprived the plaintiffs of any control over the funds and invested exclusive control in the Credit
Union. Id. at 512. The court noted that such an application would be subject to criticism as being too
broad and eviscerating provisions meant to protect creditors. Id. However, the court stated that its
solution would result in an abdication of control by the creditor, thus balancing the interests of the
debtor and the creditor and giving effect to the broad language of section 362(a)(3). Id.
The court also found the freeze violated section 362(a)(4) as an act to enforce a lien against property
of the estate. Id. The freeze was a unilateral determination of a valid setoff right because it relied on
a lien created by the state law. Id. Further, the freeze violated section 362(a)(6) as an act to collect
a pre-petition debt. Id.
172. 967 F.2d at 510.
173. Id.
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the freeze is a unilateral determination that the setoff is valid, the Code
provides for a judicial determination of a valid right to setoff and thus
dispenses with creditor self-help. 74
The Patterson court recognized the concern of the credit union that the
court's holding could make a creditor's setoff rights nonexistent.175
However, the court refused to acknowledge that a credit union could protect
its interest only through an administrative freeze. 176  Rather, the court
noted that the creditor may file an ex parte motion pursuant to sections
362(f) or 363(e) and accompany the motion with funds to be paid into the
registry of the bankruptcy court.117  This procedure would protect the
interests of both parties-the creditor is protected from a removal of funds,
and the debtor is protected from an erroneous unilateral determination of
the creditor that it possesses a valid right of setoff.
71
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PA7TERSON SOLUTION AND A PROPOSAL
A. Analysis of Patterson
The Patterson decision provides a fresh solution to an old problem. The
discussion in Part III of the cases interpreting the freeze illustrates the
logjam created by merely deciding whether the freeze violates the
automatic stay. Such a broad determination without a consideration of the
context of the litigation is made impossible by the competing policies and
the lack of direction provided by the Code on this issue. Realizing this
difficulty, the court in Patterson correctly adopted a functional approach
which balanced the competing interests of the creditor and the debtor.
The court's procedure avoided the problems associated with using the
174. Id. The court noted that the case demonstrated the inherent flaw in using the freeze as a
means to protect a valid right to setoff. Id. The Credit Union was mistaken in its assertion of its right
to setoff because the "right of setoff had not yet ripened." Id. The plaintiffs had not failed to make
a payment when the freeze was imposed, and therefore, under Alabama law, there was no mutuality.
Id. at 511.
175. "If the Credit Union's right to setoff were later determined valid, and if the funds in the
account had been disbursed to payees, then the Credit Union's right to setoff would indeed be an empty
right" 967 F.2d at 511.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 967 F.2d at 511-513. The Patterson court's analysis was followed by the court in In re Flynn,
143 B.R. 798, 801-02 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992). The Flynn court held that the Code prohibited the freeze
under section 362(a)(3) as a self-help mechanism. Id. at 801. However, the Flynn court adopted
Patterson's rule to prevent creditor abuses and to protect against debtors unfairly depleting estate assets.
Id. at 802.
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freeze by establishing a workable alternative. Because the court would
render the determination of the rights of the parties, the creditor's actions
would not be open to automatic stay prohibitions. 79 Further, the
Patterson court's approach envisioned that the court could ensure the
protection of the various rights of the parties concerning setoff, adequate
protection, and the cash collateral.80 Therefore, the procedure would
fulfill the goal of an orderly administration of the estate while providing the
debtor with relief and protection from unilateral action by the creditor.
Despite its fresh approach, there are some flaws to the court's reasoning
in Patterson. First, it is not clear that the provisions cited by the court
would allow for a full determination of the parties' rights. For example,
under section 363(e), the focus is upon the debtor. In this context, the
creditor's right to setoff would be ignored because, under this section, the
only issue is whether the creditor is offered adequate protection by the
trustee.' While it is true that the burden of proof on adequate protec-
tion would rest with the trustee, the proceeding would still only concern use
of the cash collateral and not the creditor's right to setoff.'82
Importantly, if the court believed that section 363(e) proceedings must
be expanded, it was not clear how the court reached this decision. The
court simply stated that the proper balance between debtor and creditor
rights would be struck. 83  Even if an expansion was intended by the
Patterson court, the legislative history suggests that such an expansion
would be inconsistent for either section 363(e) or section 362(f). 84 A
Senate report states that "the only issue will be the lack of adequate
179. In re Patterson, 967 F.2d at 512. The court held that a creditor can file an cx parte motion
pursuant to sections 362(f) or 363(e) and accompany such motion with funds from the debtor's account
to be paid into the bankruptcy court registry. Id. Section 362 specifically envisions such a procedure
and, therefore, the bank's actions would not fall within the prohibition of section 362(a). 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 (1988). The action would not be unilateral determination by the bank of its setoff right. It would
be an "abdication of control by the creditor in favor of the bankruptcy court's determination .... ." 967
F.2d at 512.
180. In re Patterson, 967 F.2d at 511.
181. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 17, 363.06, at 363-29.
182. See Domenic L. Massary, III, Adequate Protection Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, in
ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 171 (William L. Norton, Jr. ed., 1979); 11 U.S.C. § 363(e)
(1988). Section 362's focus is entirely on whether adequate protection has been provided for the
creditor's interest. Massary, supra, at 179. Obviously, there is no need for adequate protection if there
is no setoffright. Thus, the procedure, which is meant to decide whether there is a valid right to setoff,
is assumed by the motion, and the whole purpose of the court's procedure is eradicated.
183. In re Patterson, 967 F.2d 505, 511 (Bankr. 11th Cir. 1992).
184. See S. REP. NO. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5841.
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protection, the debtor's equity in the property, and the necessity of the
property to an effective reorganization of the debtor" in a 362(f) proceed-
ing." 5 Whether a right to a setoff exists would appear to be the sort of
counterclaim which would not be permitted at the hearing provided by
Congress.1
8 6
In addition, section 362(f) has traditionally been used only in very
limited contexts." 7 This limited use is due to the importance of notice
to the debtor before granting relief from the automatic stay.' As a
result, the circumstances which have justified relief under the section have
been narrow-the creditor must show an immediate and significant
threat.' 9 Therefore, the court's proposal to allow the bank to move
under section 362(f) for relief from the stay would result in the section's
significant expansion.' Such expansion may run into constitutional
objections. 9'
Second, the court failed to give full protection to the creditor's right to
a setoff permitted under state law. The right to a setoff is often a
bargained-for right as part of the loan contract.'92 By broadly pronounc-
ing that a freeze is always a violation of the automatic stay,93 the court
impermissibly eliminated a needed device to protect that right in certain
situations.' In response to the Patterson court's analysis, creditors may
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, § 3.31, at 340-43; 2 COLLIER, supra note 17, 362.09, at
362-81; PATRICK A. MURPHY, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRupTcY 6-22 (2d ed. 1992).
188. 1 EPSTEIN El AL., supra note 15, § 3.31, at 341; 2 COLLIER, supra note 17, 362.09, at 362-
81.
189. See I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, § 3.31, at 340-43.
190. The Bankruptcy Rules mandate that the showing of irreparable damage required by the section
be made, inter alia, by reference to specific facts shown by affidavit which establish an imminent risk.
See I EPSTEIN E' AL., supra note 15, § 3.31, at 341. In the typical Patterson-type scenario, there is
merely an unarticulated threat of dissipation of cash collateral. It is clear that this showing would not
be sufficient under the current workings of section 362(f) to allow for relief.
191. Due process requires adequate notice before rights are affected. See I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 15, § 3.31, at 343. Because the account funds would be placed within the court's registry, the
debtor's right to those funds would be hindered without prior notice of the bank's action. Therefore,
there must be a compelling rationale to allow for the bank to use section 362(f), which may be lacking
due to the nonspecific nature of the threat to the bank's interest. Id.
192. See Ahart, supra note 30, at 194-95.
193. In re Patterson, 967 F.2d at 510.
194. See infra part V.B. (arguing that the freeze should be allowed in a liquidation to protect
creditors' setoff rights).
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set off at the first sign of financial distress by the debtor.' Such a result
would be contrary to the result bankruptcy policy seeks to achieve.
B. A New Perspective
Because the justification for placing an administrative freeze is to protect
setoff fights, any evaluation of the bank's right to freeze must take into
account the rationale for allowing a setoff,'96 In determining whether a
creditor is entitled to setoff, a court must first look to the two overarching
policies of bankruptcy: debtor protection and creditor control. While it is
true that bankruptcy has evolved from a punitive, creditor-oriented model
toward an affirmative, debtor's remedy,'97 the setoff provision reflects a
balance of these competing goals.' Therefore, the court must also
balance the creditor and debtor interests when ruling on the administrative
freeze.
When the bank's claim to a setoff is strong, then the goal of creditor-
control and equitable treatment for creditors should tip the balance in favor
of permitting a freeze. In this scenario, the Code's recognition of the right
to setoff should be given greater weight and the bank should be allowed to
freeze the funds in the debtor's account.
Typically, a creditor's setoff right is strongest in liquidation cases. 99
195. See Richard Sauer, Special Problems of Banks With Bankruptcy Debtor Customers, 61 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 95, 111 (1987) (noting that to not allow an administrative freeze will encourage bankers
"to implement setoff at the first hint of a contemplated bankruptcy proceeding, which is exactly the
result Congress sought to avoid_').
196. It should be noted that the right to setoff is more restricted under the current Code than was
the case under section 68 of the Chandler Act. The earlier setoff provision was considered to be too
broad because certain creditors received a preference to the detriment of other creditors and the debtor's
estate. 4 COLLIER, supra note 17, 553.02, at 553-10. Recognition of the fact that setoff, while not
completely disfavored under the Code, is meant to be used in a limited context, supports a view
restricting the right to use an administrative freeze.
197. The English antecedents to the current Bankruptcy Code were creditors' remedies designed
to provide satisfaction for a creditor's claim. In the United States, bankruptcy evolved toward an
affirmative debtor's remedy through development of affirmative procedures for the debtor, including
the ability by which debt relief can be achieved without surrender of all or most of the debtor's
property. See I WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPrCY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1.01-.03
(1992).
198. Section 553 recognizes the right to setoff but limits its use in order to meet debtor's needs.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text. For example, the setoff right is limited by the "improvement
in position" test and is stayed by section 362. However, it is allowed even though it results in a
preference for the creditor invoking the right. See supra note 48.
199. The legislative history reflects that the automatic stay in a liquidation case is meant to relieve
the debtor of harassing actions by creditors seeking payment. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 125 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6086-87. In this context, the administrative
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The debtor's interest in the cash collateral is limited and the repercussions
of an erroneous determination of the setoff right for the debtor are not
great."' If an erroneous determination is made, the trustee can move for
a turnover to the estate under section 542.21 Therefore, the bank should
be able to act swiftly to protect its rights.
In contrast, when the rationale for allowing a setoff in the situation
before the court is weak, then the bankruptcy goal of debtor protection
becomes dominant and the freeze should not be allowed. The automatic
stay trumps the right of the bank to freeze in this situation because setoff
is an aberration of the Code's policy not to allow preferences for unsecured
creditors. 2 When a setoff would present problems for the resolution of
the bankruptcy, a court should not allow the self-help device of the
administrative freeze to protect that right. The creditor should use other
remedies provided in the Code, such as the motion for relief from the stay,
for protection of its setoff right.0 3
The debtor's rights are particularly strong in a reorganization case.
2°
freeze should not be viewed to fall within that prohibition because it is a passive act by the bank. The
bank is merely maintaining the balance in the account and is not actively seeking repayment. This
evaluation is mandated by the strong setoff interest of the bank in a liquidation.
200. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6144. The legislative history indicates:
In a liquidation case, any setoff that occurs after the commencement of the case has no effect
on the debtor. The amount that the creditor recovers through setoff will permit him to
recover a higher percentage of his total claim than other creditors, but it will not interfere with
the debtor's operation or business in any way, because the debtor has already gone out of
business. Whether the setoff is of a bank deposit or of mutual debts and credits with another
merchant or business, the effect is the same.
Id.
201. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1988). This section provides that "an entity... in possession, custody
or control during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 ....
or that the debtor may except under section 522 ... shall deliver to trustee, and account for, such
property.. ." Id.
202. See Carmelita J. Hammon, Setoff In Bankruptcy: Is the Creditor Preferred or Secured?, 50
U. COLO. L. REv. 511, 512 (1979); John C. McCoid IlI, Setoff. Why Bankruptcy Priority?, 75 VA. L.
REv. 15, 19 (1989).
203. Note that the analysis does not turn on whether the right to setoff should be recognized in a
certain context. The Code has already provided that the setoff right is preserved in bankruptcy. I 1
U.S.C. § 553. Rather, the question is whether a court should allow the use of an administrative freeze
in order to protect that right. As the freeze is an extra-judicial or self-help mechanism for the bank,
its use should be limited to those situations in which the setoff right is least problematic for the debtor
and when the rationale for setoff is highest. This occurs most frequently in the liquidation context.
204. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6144. The legislative history states:
The situation for the treatment of setoff in a reorganization case is very different than in a
liquidation case. In order to accomplish a successful reorganization, it is important that
Washington University Open Scholarship
472 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 72:441
There, the cash collateral represents the very lifeblood of the business."'
An erroneous determination of the bank concerning the right to setoff can
have disastrous effects on the debtor's reorganization efforts. 0 6 There-
fore, the court should demand that a judicial determination of the right to
setoff be made before the bank acts against the account by freezing it.2
7
Because the rationale for a setoff is weak, the balance between the policies
of debtor protection and creditor control favors allowing use of the funds
until the creditor seeks a positive ruling from the court.
Thus, under the proposed analysis, determination of when the rationale
for the setoff is strong or weak is made by reference to the type of
proceeding before-the court. The use of the administrative freeze would not
be a violation of the stay in a liquidation but would be a violation in a
reorganization.
This paradigm is an improvement on the Patterson decision because it
does not broadly discount the freeze. The Patterson decision is
overinclusive for it disapproves of the freeze when it is justified and,
business proceed as usual for the debtor. Setoff is an interruption in the conduct of business,
and may have detrimental effects on the attempted reorganization ... fs]etoff in the
reorganization context makes reorganization more difficult, because it deprives the debtor of
the use of its cash on deposit with banks.
Id.
205. See M Bank Dallas, N.A. v. O'Connor (In re O'Connor), 808 F.2d 1393, 1397-98 (10th Cir.
1987). The court stated:
Debtors ... have proposed to deal with cash collateral for the purpose of enhancing the
prospects of reorganization. This quest is the ultimate goal of Chapter 11. Hence, the
Debtors' efforts are not only to be encouraged, but also their efforts during the administration
of the proceeding are to be measured in light of that quest. Because the ultimate benefit to
be achieved by a successful reorganization inures to all the creditors of the estate, a fair
opportunity must be given to the Debtors to achieve that end.
Id.
206. In their article, Benjamin Weintraub and Alan N. Resnick conclude that because the funds are
cash collateral, the right of the debtor to their use, without approval, is no greater than the bank's right
to withhold. Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 3, at 324. Therefore, the freeze should be permissible
pending a determination of the adequacy of the bank's protection upon the debtor's request for use of
the funds. Id. This analysis is flawed for it ignores the need for businesses to use the collateral to
reorganize successfully. By refusing to look at the freeze within a specific context, and by stressing
the bank's interest in preventing dissipation of the account, the authors fail to realize that the right of
the debtor to use the collateral would trump the right of the bank to withhold.
207. This result is further dictated by the realization that the purpose of the automatic stay in a
Chapter 1I context is to facilitate a reorganization. See supra note 14. It is to preserve the secured
creditors position, within equitable limits, during the filing of the case and the confirmation of a plan
of reorganization. See Central Trust Co. v. Mr. D. Realty Co. (In re Mr. D. Realty Co.), 27 B.R. 359,
364 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). This policy would mandate that the freeze be stayed to facilitate the
reorganization and to provide equitable relief to the debtor.
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thereby, unnecessarily requires creditors to seek hasty ex parte relief."'
This paradigm also represents an improvement on the cases which hold
that the freeze violates the stay in all situations. Those decisions focus on
the broad application of the automatic stay provision without discussing the
policy justifications for such an application. The cases divorce the stay
from its underpinnings and do not permit the freeze when the very rationale
behind the stay would dictate its use.
The paradigm is likewise an improvement on the cases which hold that
the freeze does not violate the stay. Those decisions unnecessarily stress
the cash collateral and turnover provisions of the Code.0 9 Moreover,
those cases fail to consider adequately the debtor's interest by stating that
the creditor is merely complying with the policy of the Code in freezing the
account and preserving its setoff interests.2
As for the turnover rationale, it is unpersuasive that an administrative
freeze should be allowed to avoid an implied violation of section 542(c).
Under section 542(b), a creditor with a right to setoff need not turn over
property to the trustee.2 t' Thus, the only time a creditor with knowledge
of a filing could be liable to the estate is if it turned over property of the
estate to third persons when it had no right to setoff.2"2 This dilemma
may not be solved by a freeze because a freeze is designed merely to
protect a setoff right.2"3 A bank that froze an account in which it held
no right to setoff would be overreaching and should be prohibited from
doing so by the automatic stay.
208. The use of a freeze would be justified in a liquidation context which the Patterson decision
would not recognize.
209. See supra part III.B.
210. That this right has been overly stressed can be seen by reference to McCoid, supra note 202,
at 43. Professor McCoid cogently notes that historical and contemporary justifications for setoff in
bankruptcy are unsound. The natural justice rationale for setoff portrays bankruptcy as a duel between
a creditor with a setoff power against the debtor's interests rather than against other creditors. Id. This
justification became misplaced with the advent of discharge. Id. at 16. Further, the security rationale
for setoff provides a preference when the relationship of mutual obligation between debtor and creditor
does not warrant giving that creditor a priority. Id.
211. Section 542(b) provides an exception for creditors' with setoff rights. An entity that owes a
debt which is property of the estate must put the debt to the trustee, "except to the extent that such debt
may be offset under section 553." II U.S.C. § 542(b) (1988).
212. If the creditor had a right to setoff, then section 542(b) exempts the creditor from turning over
property subject to the setoff right to the estate. Id.
213. See Wynn, supra note 2, at 86-87; Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 3, at 318.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The ultimate issue is whether a creditor should be allowed the extra-
judicial, self-help device of the administrative freeze in order to protect its
setoff rights stated by the Code. When the claim to such a right is
strongest the creditor should be allowed to use the freeze and the debtor
may seek use of the funds under section 363. When the rationale for a
setoff is weak, the freeze should be disallowed and the creditor should seek
to prohibit use of funds under section 362 or 363.
This proposal is an interpretive device which can be used by courts to
make sense out of the competing policies and language of the Code
provisions. The approach attempts to provide a fresh alternative for a court
faced with an administrative freeze problem by putting forth a policy-based
rationale for decisions. This approach reconciles the competing rationales
and language of both the Code sections and the cases interpreting those
sections.
Scott T Silverman
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